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The role of women in Western societies changed dramatically in the 20th century. We study 
how political empowerment affected women’s emancipation as reflected in their life choices 
like marital decisions and labor market participation. The staggered introduction of female 
suffrage in Swiss states allows us to exploit the variation in the age women experienced 
enfranchisement to estimate the differences in life choices between women who were socialized 
in a world where women had a formal say in politics and those who were mainly socialized 
before. Our empirical findings document that political empowerment strongly increased female 
labor force participation, weakened marital bonds and motivated human capital investment. 
Moreover, being socialized with female suffrage increased long-term voting participation and 
perceptions of control. Our evidence suggests that changes in formal political institutions hold 
the power to change norms. 
JEL-Codes: D020, D720, J120, J160, J220, J240, Z130. 
Keywords: female suffrage, voting rights, institutions, norms, female labor force participation, 
marital choices, voting participation, efficacy. 
 
 
 
Michaela Slotwinski 
University of Basel 
Faculty of Business and Economics 
Peter Merian-Weg 6 
Switzerland – 4002 Basel 
michaela.slotwinski@unibas.ch 
Alois Stutzer 
University of Basel 
Faculty of Business and Economics 
Peter Merian-Weg 6 
Switzerland – 4002 Basel 
alois.stutzer@unibas.ch 
 
  
  
  
 
April 2, 2018 
In the struggle for female suffrage and female emancipation in Switzerland, the book entitled “Frauen im 
Laufgitter” (in English “Women in the Playpen”) by Iris von Roten (1958) was probably the most 
prominent publication. It was perceived as scandalous and worked as a catalyst in public discourse. 
We are grateful to Patrick Balles, Christin Benesch, Kerstin Hansen, Ulrich Matter, Armando Meier, 
Reto Odermatt, Frank Pisch, Conny Wunsch and seminar participants at ETH Zurich and the University 
of St. Gallen for helpful comments. 
1 Introduction
The struggle for political equality between women and men was one of the fundamental social
movements in the 20th century in many countries. However, so far, little is known about what
this constitutive change unleashed on the individual level, i.e. what the consequences of being
politically empowered were for women’s life choices. We focus on the introduction of female
suffrage as a historic event, which allows us to learn about the effects of legal rights on atti-
tudes and norms, and ultimately economic and household decisions on education, labor force
participation, marriage and divorce. Consequences of political empowerment are hard to study
in an empirically rigorous way. First, most countries introduced female suffrage in the 1920s
or just after the second world war, a period for which individual level data is scarce. Second,
with individual introduction dates of female suffrage in one country, it is difficult to separate
age, cohort and general time effects from any potential effect of women’s empowerment. We
therefore concentrate on the experience in a strongly decentralized country, i.e., Switzerland.
While Switzerland is certainly one of the oldest and most developed democracies, it took about
sixty cantonal and two federal popular votes between 1919 and 1971 to achieve a gradual intro-
duction of female suffrage on the level of states (i.e. cantons), until there was almost a uniform
political participation right for women and men in 1971 (Ruckstuhl, 1986).
Building on theories that emphasize conditions during childhood, as well as adolescence and
early adulthood, as decisive in the formation of attitudes and norms (see, e.g., Roberts et al.,
2006; McAdams and Olson, 2010), we study how socialization in an environment in which women
hold formal democratic participation rights changed women’s lives in terms of their labor force
participation, their educational attainment, as well as their marital status. We hypothesize
that political empowerment increases the bargaining power of women, i.e., it changes women’s
threat point in everyday bargaining as they are - and feel - more in control of their lives. This
puts women on a more equal footing with men, allowing them to renegotiate the norms related
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to traditional gender roles, making employment more attractive, marriage less necessary, and
divorce more affordable.
We exploit the variation in the age at which women experienced enfranchisement caused by
the staggered introduction of female suffrage across Swiss cantons. Our identification draws
on the idea that repeated cross-sectional data in combination with regional variation in the
exposure to a treatment during individuals’ childhood and influential years brings us closer to
causal estimates, as it allows for the inclusion of age, time, and cohort fixed effects, taking care
of many potential confounding factors. Such an approach has, for example, been put forward
by Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2013) to investigate the effect
of exposure to macroeconomic downturns on individuals’ risk and redistribution preferences,
and has further been applied by Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2015) to determine whether
exposure to democracy affects democratic preferences. Using register data from the Swiss
population census over several decades, we identify the effects of political empowerment on
female life choices by comparing how women who got the right to vote at different ages differ in
their status years later. Importantly, these women were exposed to the same labor, marriage,
and divorce laws at any point in time.
We find that women who have been denied the right to vote until after the age of 17 have an
up to 6 percentage point lower probability of being engaged in paid work than women who
experienced enfranchisement before the age of 17. Thereby the difference is increasing in the
age of enfranchisement. We further document that women enfranchised later have a higher
probability of being a housewife by up to 5 percentage points, and that they have a higher
probability of working part-time for those working, by up to 5 percentage points. Women who
got the right to vote later are further more likely to marry and to stay married. Finally, women
who were socialized in an environment without female suffrage are more likely to end up with
a low level of education, the effect ranging from about 2 percentage points, for women who
experienced the introduction of female suffrage between the age of 17 and 20, to up to about 6
percentage points for those enfranchised later in life. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the
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effects on education choices were largest for women in municipalities that were most conservative
regarding the equality of women and men. We proxy these attitudes with the support for the
first national referendum on the introduction of female suffrage in Switzerland in 1959, before
any canton introduced female suffrage. Interestingly, the life choices of women in more liberal
municipalities were also affected by the institutional change. This suggests that in our context
the effects of changes in attitudes and norms have been magnified, as participation rights were
institutionally confirmed and implemented.
Corroborating our interpretation of the patterns observed in the data, we find no evidence for
sorting across cantons along our treatment variation. Moreover, a simulation analysis indicates
that general societal changes around the time of the institutional reforms are unlikely to be the
driver of our findings. This is consistent with the fact that we do not see similar patterns for
foreign national women, who were also born and raised in Switzerland, who, however, are not
allowed to vote.1
We complement our main analyses on the effect of formal political participation rights on life
choices, providing direct evidence that female suffrage affects women’s political behavior as well
as their reported efficacy and perceptions of control. Based on survey data from the Swiss
Electoral Studies (Selects), we observe an up to 11-percentage-point lower voting participation
for women socialized in an environment without female suffrage until after they reached age of
17. Consistently, women who experienced enfranchisement late are also less likely to discuss
elections and tend to find politics complicated. Based on the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), we
find that women who experienced the introduction of female suffrage after they turned 17 are
more likely to report that they have little influence on life and that others determine what they
do, results that we relate to lower self-efficacy.
1 The same argument holds for a differential supply of public services depending on the introduction of female
suffrage (for related evidence in the Indian context see Ghani et al. 2013). If women in politics support
policies that help women to reconcile family obligations and a job, such as policies promoting child care
facilities or full-time schools, these services are available for Swiss and non-Swiss women alike. Similarly, if
female politicians support the recruitment of women in public service jobs, this effect is expected to hold
independently of the age of the women.
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Our analysis is motivated by and speaks to different streams of research. First, our analysis
links to research on how political rights affect individuals’ choices and preferences. This includes
the notion of political socialization from a life course perspective, emphasizing that people’s
political attitudes are formed in young adulthood (see, e.g., Franklin et al., 2004; Plutzer, 2002;
Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2013).2 While consequences for individual decisions beyond political
participation are included conceptually, they are rarely studied explicitly. We offer such a
contribution by evaluating the consequences for womens’ life choices.
Second, we complement research that studies the long-term determinants and the persistence
of gender roles in society (see, e.g., Fernandez and Fogli, 2009), and traces and identifies their
historical roots (see, e.g., Alesina et al. 2013 and Teso 2016, and for a review Giuliano 2017).
While this research strikingly documents the persistence of gender norms, our setting allows
us to test whether constitutional rights are able to trigger a transformation in these norms in
the medium term, i.e. over one to two generations. We show that power sharing can unleash
substantial changes in individuals’ economic and marital outcomes within a generation.
Third, our evidence complements previous research showing that circumstances that lead to
higher bargaining power for women in the economic sphere increase measures of empowerment
in other life domains, for instance, marriage exit options, social independence, and financial
autonomy (see, e.g., Gottlieb and Robinson, 2016; Teso, 2016; Tur-Prats, 2016). Such circum-
stances have further been found to increase investment in girls’ human capital (see, e.g., Ashraf
et al., 2016), to reduce violence against women (see, e.g., Alesina et al., 2016), and to lead to
generally more egalitarian norms (see, e.g., Tur-Prats, 2016).
Fourth, our analysis is also related to contributions evaluating the effects of female suffrage
on public policy. Granting democratic rights to new groups in the population who differ in
their policy preference is expected to change policy outcomes.3 With regard to female suffrage,
2 There is significant related evidence that the eligibility to vote in young adulthood has persistent effects
on political participation (see, e.g., Coppock and Green, 2016; Meredith, 2009), and political attitudes
(Mullainathan and Washington, 2009).
3 A related literature therefore studies the conditions for suffrage extensions (see Koukal 2017 and Koukal
and Eichenberger 2017 for the Swiss case, and Doepke et al. 2012 for a review).
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empirical studies on Western democracies indicate that government expenditures were directed
towards higher spending for public health and social welfare after women got the right to vote
(see Miller 2008 for the US and Aidt and Dallal (2008) for six Western European countries).
However, there is no clear evidence for a general increase in government size (see Lott and Kenny
1999 for the US and Stutzer and Kienast 2005 for Switzerland). In our analysis, we focus on
direct effects of how female empowerment changes individual life choices, abstracting from, and
statistically controlling for, changes in public policy that might affect women in general.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical context in
which we relate formal political participation rights to individual life choices leading to our main
hypotheses. In Section 3, we introduce the institutional setting, and in Section 4, we describe
the empirical strategy. The census data used in our main analysis is described in Section 5.
Section 6 presents the results, and Section 7 discusses main challenges to their identification
and interpretation. Section 8 offers concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical context and hypotheses
Gender roles and norms are to a large extent social constructs. They are formed through in-
teraction or socialization, as well as by the imitation of role models (Bussey and Bandura,
1999). Within an economic framework, they affect people’s behavior either as restrictions or
preferences. In the latter case, particular norms are internalized and become part of an indi-
vidual’s self-concept or identity (for a conceptualization in economics, see Akerlof and Kranton
2000). Importantly, preferences and norms which drive economic agents’ behavior are partly
shaped and affected by institutions (see, e.g., Bowles 1998). We develop a theoretical argument
that this mechanism in social transformation is particularly important in the case of political
participation rights.
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A fundamental aspect of institutions of collective decision-making is whether they allow for
participation. In democracy theory, participation rights have been framed as procedural goods
of democracy related to individuals’ feeling of being respected, treated with dignity, and having a
sense of personal control (Lane, 1988). This reasoning builds on substantial research on mastery,
self-determination and self-efficacy in psychology (see, e.g., Gecas, 1989). Institutions that
allow the experience of autonomy, competence and relatedness strengthen people’s perception
of control and causal agency, two important factors in human motivation and action.4 The
acquisition of participation rights and their use are thus seen as a source of self-efficacy and
esteem.
Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize that acquiring and exercising formal political partici-
pation rights increases women’s perceived efficacy and affects their long-term decision making.
This effect is reinforced by contact with peers who experience the same, and the exposure to
female role models who express higher efficacy, self-esteem, and behave less traditionally. The
latter mechanism might be particularly strong in the relationship between mothers and their
daughters.5 The perceived empowerment puts women on a more equal footing with men, allow-
ing them to renegotiate the norms related to traditional gender roles, i.e. norms that prescribe
that women should focus on preparing for life in a marriage, taking care of the family and the
home, not aspiring to paid work and therefore not uselessly investing in human capital. Specif-
ically, it increases their bargaining power within the household (Manser and Brown, 1980). All
this might contribute to women’s emancipation, an emancipation that brings them out of the
home and into the labor market, allowing them to think about independent living arrangements.
The literature on personality development across the human life course overall agrees that at-
titudes and personality are to a large extent formed during adolescence and early adulthood.
4 Self-efficacy of children and their parents has been found to be a key determinant of educational aspirations
and long-term behavior (Bandura et al., 2001).
5 Less traditional gender roles seem to be strongly connected to women’s self-efficacy perception and to be
of importance for gender development (Bussey and Bandura, 1999). In line with these arguments, e.g.,
Beaman et al. (2012) find that being exposed to female leadership in their village increases girls career
aspirations and educational attainment.
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Even before, perceptions of appropriate gender specific behavior are partly formed during social-
ization in childhood (Witt, 1997). While there is some discussion in developmental psychology
regarding the most influential years of age (based on the impressionable years hypothesis), it is
generally found that personality and attitudes stabilize with increasing age (see, e.g. Roberts
et al. 2006, and for a review McAdams and Olson 2010).6 Based on these findings, we would
expect that the impact of introducing female suffrage would diminish with increasing age at
experience, i.e. the marginal effects would become smaller after the impressionable years as
individuals’ personality and values are mature and major life choices are settled.
Following this reasoning, we analyze whether the introduction of female suffrage had the pre-
dicted consequences by means of the following testable hypotheses. Women who mainly grow
up and are socialized in a world where women are politically empowered are more emancipated
as reflected by their life choices. In particular, these women are (i) more likely to work, (ii) more
likely to stay single or to divorce if they marry, and (iii) more likely to achieve a high level of
education. Furthermore, as attitudes and personality stabilize over the life span, we hypothesize
that any effects on emancipation are smaller, the later a woman experiences enfranchisement.
3 Institutional setting
While Switzerland is one of the oldest and most well-established democracies, it is also one
of the last developed countries where women were granted the right to vote. Most countries
introduced women’s franchise in the 1920s or after the second world war, around 1945. In
Switzerland between 1919 and 1971, it took about 60 cantonal and 2 federal popular votes until
there was a nearly uniform political participation right for women and men at the federal level
6 Specifically, some studies emphasizes the age between 18 and 25 as being particularly influenced by impres-
sions from outside the family, and thus early adulthood (see, e.g. Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Roberts et al.,
2006). Others report that some personality characteristics stabilize even earlier (between the age of about
12 and 15), i.e., during early adolescence, and that there might be differences with regard to the concept
investigated (see, e.g., Hooghe and Wilkenfeld, 2008; Russo and Stattin, 2017; Abdelzadeh and Lundberg,
2017; Klimstra et al., 2009).
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(as well as in most cantons).7 In February 1971, a popular initiative favoring female suffrage
was accepted in a national ballot by 65.7% of the participating male voters (Ruckstuhl, 1986).
The first movements to fight for political rights for women started in Zurich in the late 1860s and
the first cantonal votes on the introduction of female suffrage were held but declined between
1919 and 1921 in the cantons of Ticino, Neuchâtel, Basel-City, Zurich, Glarus, and Geneva.
While the process started early, there was strong resistance among the male voting population.
It was not until 1959 that the canton of Vaud, as the first canton, successfully introduced female
suffrage. Step-by-step several cantons followed, adopting it either on the municipal and/or the
cantonal level. Overall, it took about 100 years until women received equal political participation
rights on the national level. This staggered enfranchisement of women in Switzerland led to the
situation that women living in different cantons could participate in the democratic process at
different points in time (see, e.g., Ruckstuhl, 1986; Studer, 2015).
Figure 1 visualizes the variation in the years in which women in each Swiss canton were exposed
to their first formal opportunities for political participation. The initial opportunity might
have been on the municipal, cantonal or federal level, thereby allowing women to participate
in municipal, cantonal, or federal elections and votes. Thus, for cantons that adopted female
suffrage after its introduction on the federal level, the year of first exposure is set to 1971. Of
these latter cantons, nine introduced female suffrage at the cantonal level in the same year, and
four cantons one year later in 1972. In total, there are eleven cantons where women experienced
suffrage before 1971, covering more than 50 percent of the Swiss population. Table A1 in
Appendix A.I lists the introduction dates of female suffrage at the cantonal as well as the
municipal level for all cantons.
Due to the staggered introduction, women of the same birth cohort but living in different
cantons experienced the introduction of female suffrage at different ages. For instance, while a
woman born in Vaud in 1935 was allowed to vote in 1959, and thus at the age of 24, a woman
7 Some cantons introduced the franchise for women on the municipal and cantonal level after 1971. Appenzell
Innerrhoden was the last one, being forced by a decision of the federal court in 1990.
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Figure 1: The graph visualizes the introduction year of female suffrage in Swiss cantons (either at the
municipal, cantonal or national level). The darker bars mark the period after the introduction.
born in Bern in the same year could only participate in 1971 at the age of 36. We exploit this
variation in the age at which women experience the introduction of formal political rights to
identify whether women who mainly grew up in a world where they had a say in politics, when
compared to those who experienced this opportunity later in life, make different life choices and
adopt different attitudes.
4 Empirical strategy
We exploit the variation in the age at which women experienced the introduction of female
suffrage across Swiss cantons. We see three main aspects that are important for our empirical
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strategy. First, we adopt a life course perspective as a conceptual framework. Second, we
propose a flexible functional form to capture the long-term effects of the exposure to female
suffrage at different ages. Third, we rely on a rather restrictive fixed-effects strategy to control
for determinants of life choices that might be correlated with the suffrage extension and thus
are potential confounders.
4.1 A life course perspective on the effects of political empowerment
Our empirical design relies on a setting in which cohorts are affected at different ages with
a treatment that has a differential impact depending on the age of the treated person. If
repeated cross-sectional data on the long-term consequences are available, then in a multiple
regression framework confounding factors due to people’s cohort, age, or time effects as well
as spatial effects related to the unit at which the treatment is introduced can be controlled
for. This empirical approach has been prominently applied by, for example, Malmendier and
Nagel (2011), Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2013), and Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2015).
They exploit similar repeated cross-sectional variation to identify the effect of the duration of
exposure to democracy on preferences for democracy (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015),
of the exposure to economic uncertainty on risk taking behavior (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011),
and of experiencing a recession during one’s formative years on political preferences (Giuliano
and Spilimbergo, 2013). We analyze the effect of female suffrage from a life-course perspective
that emphasizes how conditions in an early phase of a person’s life affect attitudes, choices, and
outcomes later on.
In our context, as in the approaches above, the idea of formative years is crucial to (empirically)
model the effect of female suffrage on women’s lives. As noted before, the literature suggests
that some gender norms are already transferred during childhood. When it comes to politics, the
time of adolescence and early adulthood is proposed as being the most formative for personality
and attitude development. There is no consensus though on when the most influential phase
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starts or ends exactly. An interesting age threshold is late adolescence, when socialization within
the family becomes less important. We therefore define the reference group as including those
women who were mainly socialized when their mother had or got the right to vote, experiencing
its introduction before they turned 17. In contrast to this reference group, there are women
who spent the main part of their formative years in an environment in which women were
denied formal participation in democracy. These women experienced the introduction of female
suffrage at the age of 17 or afterwards. We later on flexibly take their age at enfranchisement
into account to capture differences in the degree of democratic socialization.
4.2 Estimation model
With the specification of our empirical model, we want to estimate how women who do not
experience female suffrage up to the age of 17 or later are characterized relative to the women
in the reference group, who experience the existence or the introduction of female suffrage
before they turn 17. We expect that the differences in attitudes and life choices between those
who are enfranchised later, compared to those who are socialized under female suffrage early
on, will increase with the years a woman lived under a regime without female suffrage. In
order to capture any such pattern, our main empirical specification includes a flexible form of
the indicator for the group experiencing female suffrage after the age of 17. Specifically, we
estimate the following linear probability model
Yict = α +
B∑
k=1
(τk1k) + υage x canton + µcohort + ηcanton x year +Xiβ + γm +  (1)
where Y is our dependent variable, measuring some outcome for individual i in canton c at time
t. We define B age groups for women who experienced female suffrage at the age of 17 or later.
1i is an indicator variable set to one if a woman’s age at which she experienced enfranchisement
falls into group k, and τk is the estimate of the difference in the outcome variable compared to
that of the reference group. In our main specification, we define four groups as follows: 11 =
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1(age_votei>16 & age_votei≤20); 12 = 1(age_votei>20 & age_votei≤25); 13 = 1(age_votei>25 & age_votei≤35);
14 = 1(age_votei>35). We cluster the standard errors at the level of the canton, i.e. the level at
which our identifying variation arises.
4.3 Control strategy
In order to isolate the effect of enfranchisement from other canton, time, cohort, or age specific
factors that might themselves be correlated with our outcome variables, we include a restrictive
set of fixed effects in our model. In our main specification, we include υage x canton, which is
a vector of canton specific age fixed effects. The age effects allow us to factor out life-cycle
effects; for instance, older women being more likely to be divorced or to work part time. We
further allow these life-cycle effects to differ across cantons. This might be relevant if the
age effects systematically differ across cantons that introduce female suffrage earlier or later.
We control for µcohort, which is a vector of birth-cohort fixed effects. This allows us to rule
out any cohort specific effects. Moreover, these fixed effects control for any national policies
targeted at particular cohorts, for instance, an adjustment of the retirement age. We include
ηcanton x year, which is a vector of canton-times-year effects. This allows us to pick up region-
specific time varying shocks related to, for example, macroeconomic development and differences
in the local labor market. Any measured outcome difference between the two groups of women
therefore cannot be explained by differences in the current institutions, the economic situation,
the political environment (or any canton-times-year unobservables) that affect all the women in
a canton alike.
Moreover, we include a vector Xi including an additional individual specific characteristic likely
to be predetermined (and correlated with people’s norms), i.e. individuals’ religious denomi-
nation. Finally, we take into account a set of municipality fixed effects γm. The latter control
for time invariant differences in general attitudes towards women and geographical conditions
across municipalities.
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The only relevant dimension we cannot control for are cohort-times-canton effects as this is
exactly the level from which our identifying variation arises. Our identification thus hinges on
the assumption that there are no unobserved factors at the cohort-canton level that correlate
with the age at enfranchisement. We are not aware of anything that could have coincided and
was not related to the introduction of female suffrage. However, we still try to validate the
assumption in the discussion in Section 7.2.
5 Data
In our main empirical analysis, we draw on harmonized micro-data of the Swiss census conducted
in the years 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. This data covers basic demographic information for the
whole Swiss population until 2000 and for a large sample of about 5 percent in 2010. Based on
this repeated cross-sectional data on demographic characteristics of over 2 million Swiss women,
we can apply the empirical strategy described above.
In our approach, it is important to be able to control for age-specific fixed effects. We therefore
restrict the sample such that we have an overlap in the variable age for women in the reference
group and the group of women experiencing the introduction of female suffrage at the age of 17
or later. Accordingly, the included age range is restricted to lie between 26 and 67 and covers
the cohorts born between 1913 and 1984. The youngest possible age we can observe of women
experiencing the introduction of suffrage after the age of 16 is 26, as the latest introduction
took place in 1971 and individuals aged 17 in this year were born in 1954 and thus were 26 in
1980 (our first observed year). The oldest individuals in the reference group to experience it
before the age of 17, are aged 67, respectively. Individuals aged 16 in the year of the earliest
introduction (1959) were born in 1943 and were 67 in 2010. The highest age at which women
in our sample experience the introduction of female suffrage is 58. Figure A1 in the Appendix
visualizes the distribution of the age at which women were enfranchised in the main sample of
Swiss females.
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Our main sample is furthermore restricted to women who are still living in the same canton
where they were born when observed. This criterion allows us to specify the age at which
they experienced the introduction of female suffrage. While the census data does not include
information on the canton of birth, it contains an indicator of whether an individual still lives
in the canton of birth.
Our main explanatory variable suffrage at agel−h captures women’s age at enfranchisement
and is defined as an indicator set to one if an individual experienced the introduction of female
suffrage between the age of l and h. Depending on the sample, different age ranges are specified.
The dependent variables of our main empirical analysis are defined as follows:
• Working : Is an indicator set to one if an individual indicates being active in the labor
market. This might be full or part time.
• Part-time: Is an indicator set to one if an individual who is working indicates she works
part time.
• Housewife: Is an indicator set to one if an individual indicates that she is working at home
and is not active in the labor market.
• Ever married : Is an indicator set to one if an individual’s marital status is married,
widowed, or divorced, and thus indicates that the individual is or was married.
• Divorce: Is an indicator variable set to one if an individual indicates she is divorced.
• Low edu.: Is an indicator set to one if an individual indicates that her highest educational
attainment is lower secondary education (Germ.: Sekundarstufe I).
• High edu.: Is an indicator set to one if an individual indicates that her highest educational
attainment is tertiary education (Germ.: Tertiärstufe).
The additional data sets including information about women’s attitudes (the Swiss Household
Panel) and political behavior (the Swiss Electoral Studies) are introduced in the respective
sections when they are analyzed.
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6 Results
The following subsection presents the results of our main empirical analysis on how socialization
in a world in which females have a say in politics affected women’s major life choices. Thereafter,
we study two sources of survey data. First, we test whether there are consistent differences in
women’s political behavior. Second, we explore the potential psychological mechanism and test
for the effect of suffrage on women’s efficacy and perception of control. In a further step, we
investigate potential effect heterogeneity, differentiating between relatively more conservative
and more liberal municipalities. In a separate Section 7, we discuss potential challenges to the
identification and interpretation of our findings.
6.1 Female suffrage and women’s major life choices
Figure 2 presents preliminary graphic evidence on whether women who experienced enfranchise-
ment before the age of 17 (the Early group) differ from those who experienced it later in life (the
Late group). Raw means by age of our eight main dependent variables are shown separately for
the two samples.
The raw differences reveal that women experiencing the introduction of female suffrage later in
life (the hollow diamonds) are, on average, less likely to work across their lifespan compared
with the group experiencing it early (the solid circles). This also seems to hold for women who
were at some time married. Further, they seem to be more likely to stay at home, slightly
more likely to marry, less likely to divorce, and more likely to attain a lower level of education.
These differences are consistent with the hypothesis that the socialization in a world where
women have a say in politics changes female life choices in a direction that suggests stronger
emancipation.
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Figure 2: These figures show the raw means of our dependent variables by age for two groups in the
main sample of Swiss women. The Early group includes women who experienced enfranchisement
before the age of 17. Women in the Late group experienced it later.
However, this evidence is only suggestive as, for example, birth cohorts and individuals in
cantons that introduced female suffrage early might differ systematically. We therefore proceed
by applying the estimation strategy described above.
Table 1 reports the estimation results for our eight main dependent variables. We adopt the
flexible specification with four age ranges for women experiencing the introduction of female
suffrage at the age of 17 or later. The coefficients are always reported in comparison with the
reference group, i.e. women enfranchised before the age of 17. Column (1) shows that women
are less likely to work the later in life they experienced female suffrage. The difference ranges
from 1.5 percentage points for those who experienced it rather early during their adolescence
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Table 1: Female suffrage and the life choices of Swiss women
Working Working Part-time House- Ever Divorced Low High
given given wife married given edu. edu.
ever mar. working ever mar.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Suffrage at
age0−16 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
age17−20 –0.015*** –0.006 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.017*** –0.014*** 0.024** –0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004)
age21−25 –0.024*** –0.011* 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.022*** –0.021*** 0.042*** –0.006*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.003)
age26−35 –0.042*** –0.025** 0.045*** 0.038*** 0.026*** –0.034*** 0.064** –0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.003) (0.006) (0.023) (0.006)
age36−58 –0.060*** –0.040** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.023*** –0.039*** 0.061* 0.004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.005) (0.009) (0.031) (0.007)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age x
canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. 0.55 0.49 0.54 0.34 0.82 0.09 0.35 0.07
No. of obs. 2,462,685 2,021,168 1,355,494 2,462,685 2,462,685 2,021,168 2,462,685 2,462,685
No. of clusters 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
R2 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.05 0.21 0.07
Notes: Main sample of Swiss women. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level and reported in
parentheses. Controls include indicators for individuals’ religious denomination.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Data source: Swiss population census individual data, 1980-2010.
or adulthood (age 17-20) up to 6 percentage points for those who experienced it rather late
in life (age 36-65), when presumably many relevant life choices had been made. Given that
the average female labor force participation rate in our sample is about 55 percent, this latter
difference is sizable and amounts to about 11 percent. In column (2), somewhat smaller but still
economically and statistically significant effects are estimated for women who were ever married.
These effects might reflect a core manifestation of emancipation, when married women engage
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in paid work. Thus, women who mainly grew up in a world in which they had a political say
are systematically more likely to participate in the labor force (a factor largely neglected in
the economic literature on female labor force participation, see, e.g., the reviews in Fernández
2013 or Gaddis and Klasen 2014). These findings are consistent with our main hypothesis.
However, contrary to the specific prediction that marginal effects are smaller when women
experience enfranchisement later in life than early in life, we find that for employment sizable
and statistically significant differences emerge even between the groups who were enfranchised
at age 36 to 58 rather than at age 26 to 35. This implies that women affected after the age
of 26 still changed their labor market participation decisions. Thus, at least for labor force
participation, the impressionable years clearly reach beyond early adulthood.
According to column (3), women who experienced the introduction of female suffrage later are
not only less likely to work, but given that they work, they are also more likely to work part-time.
The difference amounts to between 1 and about 5 percentage points (and thus for the latter
category to about 9 percent of the average probability of working part-time). Socialization in a
world with politically empowered women thus affects female labor market participation along
two margins, the extensive margin, i.e. the likelihood of working, and the intensive margin, i.e.,
working time. In column (4) we find that women enfranchised later are consistently more likely
to dedicate their time to housework.
Columns (5) and (6) in Table 1 explore our hypotheses with regard to marital decisions. Consis-
tent with the notion that female empowerment increases the self-sufficiency of women, we find
that the group socialized in an environment without female suffrage is more likely to marry.
The effect barely increases in the age of enfranchisement and ranges around 2 percentage points.
The impressionable early years are obviously more important in shaping life choices that are
made early in life. In line with the idea that empowered women are more independent and
can support themselves, those women experiencing enfranchisement later are also less likely to
divorce. The decision to divorce remains an option over the lifetime of married people and
seems to be affected by differences in the age of enfranchisement later in life as well. In sum,
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women socialized in a setting where they are granted formal political rights are less likely to
marry, and if they marry, are more likely to divorce.
Finally, in columns (7) and (8), we investigate differences in female educational attainment or
human capital investment. We find that women enfranchised later in life are more likely to
be educated to a lower secondary level, the difference amounting to between 2 to 6 percentage
points. There is little evidence for a systematic effect on achieving a tertiary education, indicat-
ing that political empowerment primarily affected the decision to engage in some professional
education after mandatory schooling.
When interpreting the documented estimates, it is important to note that they are not conven-
tional treatment effect estimates capturing effects materializing immediately after some treat-
ment. They are, rather, estimates of the accumulated differences in women’s life choices over
their life course. The decisions leading to these differences were made given their situation dur-
ing socialization and might have been taken before or after the introduction of female suffrage.
Women in the reference group, growing up and being socialized in a world where women have a
say in politics, made their decisions under the resulting mind-set. Women in the other groups,
experiencing enfranchisement later in life and therefore being socialized largely in a world where
women have no say in politics, made their life choices predominantly under the corresponding
attitudes and experiences. Thus, the estimates capture how much more likely a woman is, for
example, to work years later when she experienced female political empowerment before the
age of 17, making all relevant decisions after the introduction of female suffrage, compared to
a woman experiencing enfranchisement later in life and making at least some of the decisions
before the introduction of female suffrage. This consideration is particularly important when
interpreting the effects for the groups experiencing enfranchisement late in life. In our set of
outcomes, there are some which are expected to be amenable to change even late in life, such as
the participation in the labor market or divorce. Other outcomes like being married or educa-
tional attainment are much less amenable after a certain age (and once they have materialized).
It is therefore reasonable to observe that the differences in outcomes vis–à–vis the reference
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group are increasing in the age of enfranchisement for outcomes which remain clearly amenable,
while they stabilize for the others. This holds in our data for the difference in the probability
of working, which increases in the age of enfranchisement, as women might at any time decide
to enter the labor market, while the differences in the probability of ever being married or of
attaining a low level of education are rather stable independently of when after the age of about
25 a woman experienced enfranchisement.
Overall, we find strong evidence that the socialization in a world in which women have a say
in politics changes women’s life choices. The later in life they experience female empowerment
the less emancipatory, or the more traditional, are their life choices. They are less likely to
participate in the labor force, more likely to be married and less likely to get a divorce. Consis-
tent with lower expected returns to education, they are more likely to be educated only to the
minimum level of secondary school. These findings are consistent with, and strongly support,
the notion that political empowerment has had far reaching consequences for women’s lives and
has had the force to stimulate changes in gender roles and self-concepts that map into revealed
preferences.
6.2 Female suffrage and women’s political behavior
Theories on habit formation and socialization in political participation (see, e.g., Coppock and
Green, 2016; Akbulut-Yuksel et al., 2017; Fujiwara et al., 2016) would suggest that women
exposed to political rights later in life are also less likely to participate in politics and have less
clear preferences about political issues than those exposed to them early in life.
We draw on the cumulative data set of the Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects) between 1971
and 2011 to test this hypothesis.8 In each survey about two to four thousand individuals
are interviewed in the aftermath of Swiss national elections that take place every four years.
However, the same questions are not asked in every survey. Moreover, we concentrate on waves
8 The data is available at www.selects.ch.
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Table 2: Female suffrage and women’s political behavior
Voting Late Party Discuss Politics Political
partici- elections attach- election is compli- interest
pation decision ment often cated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Suffrage at
age0−16 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
age17−25 –0.068 0.126** –0.024 –0.066 0.031 –0.051
(0.047) (0.060) (0.058) (0.086) (0.038) (0.076)
age26−58 –0.107** 0.262*** –0.171*** –0.266*** 0.122 –0.170
(0.048) (0.088) (0.039) (0.091) (0.079) (0.121)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. 0.56 0.52 0.38 0.79 0.58 2.46
Age range 20-60 21-60 20-60 41-60 20-60 20-60
No. of obs. 2,606 1,303 2,584 732 1,711 2,608
No. of clusters 26 25 26 21 26 26
R2 0.10 0.22 0.11 0.08 0.26 0.17
Notes: The sample includes women who still live in the canton where they lived as a child. Further, as the
nationality is not reported, we restrict the sample to women who report being eligible to vote in the canton they
live in. The age ranges of the respective samples are reported, as not all the items are available in every year.
Controls include indicators for religious denomination and language region. Standard errors are clustered at the
cantonal level and are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Data source: Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects), cumulative file 1971-2011.
in which individuals reported the canton they lived in as a child. This allows us to calculate
the age at which they experienced enfranchisement as before. Given the nature of this data,
we end up with considerably smaller samples than those from the census data. Accordingly, we
concentrate on a slightly less restrictive specification with age fixed effects that do not differ
across cantons. Moreover, we distinguish between two age ranges (instead of four) for women
who were enfranchised late in their life.
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Table 2 presents the estimation results for women’s reported political behavior and preferences.
Despite the small sample, a systematic pattern emerges. Column (1) shows that women who
experienced female suffrage later in life are systematically less likely to report having voted
in the last federal election. While the confidence intervals are wide, the effect seems sizable,
amounting to around 11 percentage points, with an average participation rate of 56%. Columns
(2) to (6) further indicate that women enfranchised later make their decision about which party
to vote for later (measured by the probability of making the decision later than months/weeks
before the election), are less likely to report having a clear party attachment, are less likely
to report frequently discussing elections, are slightly more likely to support the statement that
politics is complicated, and report a slightly lower level of political interest (on a scale from 1
"not interested at all" to 4 "very interested"). While not all of these effects are statistically
significant at conventional levels, they still suggest that the group of women socialized without
access to formal political participation rights has a less clear political orientation and engages
systematically less in politics.
6.3 Mechanism: Female suffrage and women’s efficacy and percep-
tions of control
As motivated in Section 2, a potential mechanism for the effect of female suffrage on life choices
puts forward that formal political participation rights increase women’s (perceived) efficacy and
control. We draw on two waves of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) survey in 2012 and 2015
to investigate this conjecture. The two survey waves are particularly interesting as they include
a battery of questions measuring individuals’ efficacy. However, the sample is rather small and
we have no information on the canton in which respondents were living during their childhood.
Further, the highest age at which a woman in the specific sample experienced the introduction
of female suffrage is 31. Given these limitations, the assignment of the age at which women
were enfranchised might well be fuzzy and the results have to be interpreted with caution. We
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Table 3: Female suffrage and women’s perception of control
Little Wants Find Others Can do
influence in own a way determine what
on life hands to succeed what I do I want
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Suffrage at
age0−16 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
age17−25 0.694 0.281 –0.244 0.788* –0.497
(0.432) (0.279) (0.178) (0.431) (0.363)
age26−31 0.838* 0.064 –0.554 1.240* –0.772
(0.413) (0.501) (0.328) (0.619) (0.504)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. var. 4.34 7.41 7.94 3.30 7.00
No. of obs. 1,681 1,686 1,688 1,683 1,687
No. of clusters 26 26 26 26 26
R2 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.08
Notes: The sample includes women who indicate having lived in Switzerland since their birth, only holding
Swiss citizenship, and whose household has not moved since the last survey wave. If the information is available,
we further drop observations from those women who moved into the current place of residence after the age
of 15. However this is only the case for a very small fraction of the sample. The sample covers the age range
between 58 and 72. Controls include individuals’ religious denomination and spoken language. Standard errors
are clustered at the cantonal level and are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Data source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP), waves 2012 and 2015.
again specify two age ranges for women experiencing the introduction of female suffrage after
the age of 17.
Table 3 reports the estimated effects on women’s reported perception of control if they experi-
enced the introduction of female suffrage late in their formative years. According to columns (1)
to (5), these women more strongly agree with the statement that they have little influence on
life events (on a scale from 0 "completely disagree" to 10 "completely agree"), but seem not less
likely to agree with the statement that what they want is in their own hands (on a scale from
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0 "completely disagree" to 10 "completely agree"), seem to agree less with the statement that
when they really want to do something, they usually find a way to succeed at it (on a scale from
0 "completely disagree" to 10 "completely agree"), more strongly agree with the statement that
others determine what they can do (on a scale from 0 "completely disagree" to 10 "completely
agree"), and seem to agree less with the statement that they can do everything that they want
to do (on a scale from 0 "completely disagree" to 10 "completely agree").
While not all the differences are statistically significant at conventional levels, overall they point
in the direction that women who were enfranchised later in their life feel less efficacious and in
control of their lives compared to those women who mainly grew up in an environment where
women had a formal say in politics.
6.4 Heterogeneity: Conservative vs. liberal municipalities
Finally, we investigate whether women in conservative municipalities are affected more by female
suffrage. This analysis takes up the idea that the attitudes prevalent around the introduction of
formal participation rights for women might moderate the effect of female suffrage on emanci-
patory life choices. We see two competing hypotheses. The first could be called a confirmation
hypothesis. Women from municipalities that were relatively open and where men supported
gender equality more are confirmed in their aspirations with the adoption of female suffrage
and motivated to implement their life plans. However, there is also a second one that could be
called a revelation hypothesis. For women in relatively conservative municipalities a new world
is opened up that strongly shapes their norms, and ultimately, decisions over the life course.
According to the latter hypothesis, institutional change in the form of female suffrage affects
outcomes more if at the time the traditional norms still prevailed. In contrast, the former
hypothesis emphasizes that women who are prepared, in terms of their attitudes, for gender
equality are affected relatively more by an institutional change that brings attitudes and laws
into congruence.
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Figure 3: These figures show the estimated differences for our eight main dependent variables in liberal
and conservative municipalities for the main sample of Swiss females who live in their birth municipality
when they are observed. The estimation results are reported in Table A2 in Appendix A.I.
We test the idea of effect heterogeneity across municipalities, drawing on our main sample of
Swiss women and their life choices. We approximate whether a municipality was liberal or
conservative with respect to norms regarding the role of women in society by drawing on the
municipality level voting outcomes in the first federal ballot on the introduction of women’s
voting rights in Switzerland in 1959. The share of yes votes for this constitutional amendment
captures local men’s preferences before any canton introduced female suffrage. The right to
vote for women was clearly rejected by the male Swiss citizenry. Still, there was a considerable
variation in support for the referendum across municipalities, ranging from 0 to 95 percent, with
a mean of 33.1 percent. We define conservative municipalities, relative to other municipalities
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in the same canton, as those that showed a below average approval rate in the referendum. This
classification picks up potentially many factors besides specific preferences that are correlated
with the vote outcome, such as urbanization which has to be kept in mind when interpreting
the results.9
We estimate the differential long-term effects of female suffrage interacting the indicators for
being enfranchised late with the indicator for living in a historically conservative municipality.
The results are visualized in Figure 3 and reported in Table A2 in Appendix A.I. Overall, we
observe rather similar patterns for labor market choices and divorce. For marriage, statistical
uncertainty hampers an interpretation. Different patterns emerge for education across the two
groups of municipalities when compared to the results in Section 6.1. A late enfranchisement
increases the probability of only attaining a low educational level in the more conservative
municipalities but not in the more liberal ones. For women in the former municipalities, the
effects amount to between 7 and 15 percentage points, while they are only between -0.006 and
-0.02 percentage points, and not statistically significant, for women in historically more liberal
municipalities.
Female empowerment thus seems to have most strongly affected those women who lived in
conservative environments, which are places where female suffrage was introduced against the
will of a majority of men (and many older women). Female suffrage revealed and opened
up new perspectives that dramatically changed life courses. However, women in more liberal
municipalities, where men were decisively for the introduction of female suffrage, were affected
as well. This suggests that in our context the effects of changes in attitudes and norms have
been magnified as participation rights were institutionally confirmed and implemented.
9 In order to make sure that women were exposed to these attitudes at the time of the introduction of female
suffrage, the sample is restricted to women who live in the same municipality where they lived after their
birth in this sub-analysis.
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7 Discussion
This section discusses further results and challenges to identification and to the interpretation
of our results due to potential systematic sorting and general societal changes in the middle of
the 20th century in Switzerland. We present evidence that validates our conclusion that female
suffrage changed women’s life choices.
7.1 Effects on Swiss men
An analysis of Swiss men’s life choices in relation to the introduction of female suffrage helps
to better understand the patterns for women. It is also interesting in its own right as there are
numerous potential spillover effects (see, e.g., Dahl et al. 2018 for the effects of women in male
teams). Specifically, we can study whether men make different labor market decisions when
they have experienced politically empowered women as early as during adolescence or only later
on. Effects might also occur via the labor market if men compete with women from the same
cohort in local labor markets. Women who experienced enfranchisement later and are thus less
likely to engage on the labor market might make it easier for men of the same age to find and
keep employment. They might also be less likely to work part-time, given that women stay at
home. For marital decisions, we expect to see similar patterns, given that there are small age
differences at marriage between spouses. Patterns in education are particularly interesting, as
growing up in a conservative environment without female suffrage might also capture a general
educational alienation.
Table 4 summarizes the estimates for the main outcome variables and the sample of Swiss men.
The sample is composed just like that for Swiss women. We observe no differences in men’s labor
force participation with regard to the extensive margin in column (1) in response to when they
experienced women’s enfranchisement. This finding also indicates that the pattern for women
does not reflect some systematic cohort-canton specific labor market demand effects that affect
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Table 4: Female suffrage and Swiss men’s life choices
Working Working Part-time Taking Ever Divorced Low High
given given care married given edu. edu.
ever mar. working of home ever mar.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Suffrage at
age0−16 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
age17−20 –0.001 –0.000 –0.007*** 0.002* 0.022*** –0.007*** 0.009* –0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
age21−25 0.001 0.002 –0.008*** 0.001 0.022*** –0.010*** 0.006 –0.019***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
age26−35 –0.003 –0.002 –0.012*** 0.005** 0.026*** –0.020*** 0.021** –0.029***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010)
age36−58 –0.012 –0.010* –0.014*** 0.013** 0.024*** –0.026*** 0.018 –0.029**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age x
canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. 0.91 0.91 0.06 0.01 0.77 0.07 0.19 0.22
No. of obs. 2,686,428 2,062,117 2,437,607 2,686,428 2,686,428 2,062,117 2,686,428 2,686,428
No. of clusters 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
R2 0.34 0.43 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.04 0.15 0.06
Notes: Sample of Swiss men. Controls include indicators for individuals’ religious denomination. Standard
errors are clustered at the cantonal level and reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01. Data source: Swiss population census
individual data, 1980-2010.
employment careers. With regard to the intensive margin in column (3), the correlations for
working part-time are consistent with their spouses being more likely to stay at home. For the
status of ever being married in column (5), the effect sizes closely mirror those for women. For
the status of divorce in column (6), they go in the same direction but differ slightly in size. The
results in columns (7) and (8) suggest that men’s educational choices were at most minimally
affected at the lower end of the distribution from the experience of women having the right to
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vote. Only 19% of men in our sample have a low level of formal education while the respective
fraction among women is 35%. On the upper end, sons who were raised by a mother who had
or received the right to vote early were also slightly more likely to achieve a tertiary education.
In our reading, the results for men support the interpretation that the identified differences
between those women growing up in a world in which women have a say in politics and those
experiencing the introduction of formal political rights for women later in life are due to women’s
reactions and do not merely mirror men’s life choices (or some correlated contextual factor like
educational alienation).
7.2 Sorting: Female suffrage and migration
People move for love and work when pursuing their life goals but they likely also take the prevail-
ing norms and attitudes across regions into account when deciding where to live. Accordingly, a
concern for the interpretation of the observed empirical patterns in women’s life choices might
be that they reflect regional sorting triggered by the staggered introduction of female suffrage.
Imagine the following scenario: the cohorts of women born between, say, 1930 and 1945 decide
on where to live and work after mandatory school. The relatively more progressive young women
from conservative regions move to more progressive regions within Switzerland (to work, live
and marry), where they are more likely to be exposed to female suffrage. Vice versa, relatively
more conservative young women from progressive regions might be willing to take up a job, live
and marry in more conservative parts of Switzerland, where female suffrage is adopted later.
Under this scenario our restricted sample focusing on those women who stayed in their canton
of birth might reflect a selection of relatively more conservative women in conservative cantons
and relatively more progressive women in more progressive cantons.
In the following, we discuss the results of two empirical tests that speak against the alternative
interpretation in terms of sorting. First, there is the evidence from the heterogeneity analysis
presented in Section 6.4 above. With sorting, we would expect progressive women to move
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Table 5: Female suffrage and Swiss women’s mobility
Dependent variable: Probability of being born in the canton one lives in
Suffrage at
age0−16 age17−20 age21−25 age26−35 age36−58 age17−20 x age21−25 x age26−35 x age36−58 x
Early ct. Early ct. Early ct. Early ct.
(1) Ref. 0.008 0.018 0.038* 0.051*
(0.012) (0.016) (0.022) (0.030)
(2) Ref. 0.007 0.024 0.028 0.024 –0.004 –0.032 –0.019 0.014
(0.013) (0.018) (0.028) (0.034) (0.013) (0.020) (0.037) (0.059)
Notes: Sample of all Swiss women. Early ct. is an indicator for the three cantons that adopted female suffrage in
1959/1960, i.e. Vaud, Neuchâtel, and Geneva. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level and reported in
parentheses. Estimates control for individuals’ religious denomination, age x canton FE, birth year FE, canton
x year FE, and municipality FE. The number of observations is 4,034,853, the number of clusters 26, the R2 is
0.09 in row (1) and 0.09 in row (2).
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Data source: Swiss population census individual data, 1980-2010.
away from more conservative municipalities and much less so from more liberal municipalities.
Accordingly, when restricting our analysis to women in liberal municipalities, we would expect
to see no or very small effects of being enfranchised later. However, the previous analysis
just shows somewhat smaller effects of female suffrage on women’s labor force participation
in liberal municipalities compared to the overall sample as well as the sample of conservative
municipalities.
Second, we can apply a test based on the information on whether a woman still lives in the canton
where she was born.10 If the observed differences were due to some sorting of progressive women
into progressive cantons (introducing female suffrage earlier) and some sorting of conservative
women into conservative cantons (introducing female suffrage later), we would expect to observe
that the likelihood of being born in the canton of residence decreases for the age that women
were when female suffrage was introduced in the corresponding canton. Moreover, under the
sorting scenario, more women should have left conservative cantons and, in parallel, a larger
portion of the female population in liberal cantons would have immigrated. Thus, the relation
10 We have no information on the canton of birth in our data set, which would allow us to test the selection
argument directly. However, the data contains an indicator on whether the canton an individual resides in
is his or her canton of birth.
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between the likelihood of being born in the canton of residence and the age at enfranchisement
should be even stronger for the cantons that adopted female suffrage early.
To test these predictions arising from sorting, we re-estimate our basic model, taking the prob-
ability that a woman was born in the canton she lives in as the dependent variable. The sample
now includes all Swiss women, irrespective of whether they were born in the canton they live in
or not. As is evident from Table 5 row (1), we do not observe a negative (but rather a positive)
coefficient for the difference in the likelihood of being born in the canton one lives in between
women who were enfranchised late and those in the reference group. Row (2) shows that there is
also no systematic negative difference (when the main effect and the interaction effect are added)
for cantons that introduced female suffrage before 1960, i.e., Vaud, Neuchâtel, and Geneva. We
conclude that it is rather unlikely that migration ractions drive the documented differences.
7.3 General societal change
We argue that female suffrage affected attitudes and norms contributing to societal change.
However, evolving attitudes about women’s role in society might well have driven the introduc-
tion of female suffrage in the different cantons (and most certainly did) as well as the outcomes
in women’s life choices that we observe in our empirical analysis. In order to capture the effect
of a change in formal institutions on norms and behavior in this bidirectional relationship, we
have so far estimated specifications with an extensive set of fixed effects controlling for a large
set of potential confounders. Any remaining societal change would have to be cohort-canton
specific to explain our statistical findings. This is the only additional level we cannot control
for as it coincides with the level from which we derive our variation.
In this section, we present two approaches to assess how likely our main results are due to some
general societal changes that are cohort-canton specific rather than due to the introduction of
female suffrage per se.
Effects on women of foreign nationality
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Table 6: Female suffrage and the life choices of women of foreign nationality
Working Working Part-time House- Ever Divorced Low High
given given wife married given edu. edu.
ever mar. working ever mar.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Suffrage at
age0−16 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
age17−20 0.017 0.024 0.007 –0.027 0.009 –0.017 0.013 –0.012
(0.017) (0.021) (0.038) (0.019) (0.033) (0.019) (0.034) (0.014)
age21−25 0.011 0.052* 0.006 –0.027 0.060* 0.005 0.011 –0.027
(0.022) (0.028) (0.055) (0.024) (0.032) (0.021) (0.028) (0.023)
age26−35 –0.034 0.002 0.067 0.000 0.127*** 0.017 –0.005 –0.028
(0.044) (0.054) (0.057) (0.045) (0.036) (0.032) (0.049) (0.040)
age36−58 –0.020 0.047 0.165* –0.058 0.144** 0.044 –0.017 –0.017
(0.064) (0.073) (0.090) (0.059) (0.062) (0.041) (0.065) (0.054)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age x
canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. 0.74 0.68 0.37 0.14 0.65 0.08 0.35 0.08
No. of obs. 37,224 23,981 27,219 37,224 37,224 23,981 37,224 37,224
No. of clusters 26 25 25 26 26 25 26 26
R2 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.10 0.25 0.10
Notes: Sample of non-naturalized women. Controls include indicators for individuals’ religious denomination.
Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level and reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01. Data source: Swiss population census
individual data, 1980-2010.
In Switzerland, there is a substantial number of women who do not hold Swiss citizenship and
thus are excluded from voting.11 Many of these women were born in the same cantons, during
the same years and grew up in the same setting as Swiss women in our main sample. They
thus form a comparison group that is not directly affected by the institutional change. Still, we
cannot exclude that these foreign women were affected through their female Swiss peers from
11 At the time when the cantons introduces female suffrage, this held for all the cantons but Neuchâtel.
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the same cohort when forming and executing their plans for life. This would lead to patterns in
life choices similar to those we observe for Swiss women. Such a finding would not allow us to
reject the alternative explanation of cohort-canton-specific societal changes driving the patterns.
However, if the foreign women, who were raised by mothers who did not receive the right to vote
and did not receive it themselves, do not show a similar pattern in life choices with reference to
the introduction of female suffrage, then changes in norms that are cohort-canton specific are
unlikely to be at work and unlikely to be responsible for the findings for Swiss women.
Table 6 reports the estimates of the main specification for the sample of women of foreign
nationality. The number of foreign women born in Switzerland is considerably lower than that
of Swiss women. Therefore, the confidence bounds are much wider than for the effects reported
in Table 1. However, we can still check whether the sign and magnitude of the estimated
differences are similar. In general, the point estimates are much smaller and partly reverse signs
compared to those for the sample of Swiss women. The discrepancy is particularly pronounced
for the variables capturing education choices. Further, there is no clear pattern of increasing
effect sizes with enfranchisement at a higher age. There is just one effect that is rather similar
to our findings in the Swiss female sample, i.e. the effect on the likelihood of ever being married.
Simulation analysis
We pursue a second, more direct, test of whether it is the time institutional changes come about
in general or whether it is the actual year of the introduction of female suffrage that drives our
findings. For this, we run a simulation with estimates for the coefficient of the indicator of the
group in the sample that experienced the introduction of female suffrage latest. Rather than
using the actual year of the introduction of female suffrage, we randomly assign introduction
years to the cantons when calculating at which age a woman gained access to formal political
participation rights. In this the introduction year of female suffrage is randomly chosen per
canton from a normal distribution with the expected value of the real introduction year and a
standard deviation of 10 years. We repeatedly estimate the coefficient of the indicator, taking
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Figure 4: These figures visualize the distribution of simulated coefficients for two example dependent
variables, i.e. the probability of working and the probability of being divorced, for the sample of Swiss
women. The red vertical line marks the coefficient when the actual introduction year is used.
the same set of fixed effects into account as in the main specification and using the same sample
of Swiss women. If the observed differences were, rather, due to societal change at the time
around the introduction of female suffrage, affecting women differently depending on their age,
we would expect the simulated coefficients to be just as high as those when we consider the
actual introduction dates in a large fraction of runs. If the observed effects were, however, bound
to the year of actual institutional change, it would be rather unlikely to observe estimates of the
same magnitude. Due to the chosen normal distribution, the randomly chosen year is likely to
be somewhere around the real introduction year. As a consequence, the simulation constitutes
a rather conservative test of whether we observe just as large effects when choosing random
years close to the actual introduction dates.
Figure 4 presents two example distributions of simulated coefficients for the group experiencing
the introduction of female franchise latest on the likelihood of working and being divorced
given married from 1,500 simulation runs. The red vertical line indicates the estimate resulting
under the actual introduction dates. As becomes evident, for these two outcomes variables, the
likelihood of obtaining stronger coefficient estimates than in the actual sample is rather low.
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Table 7: Summary of the placebo simulations for the main sample of Swiss women
Working Part-time House- Ever Divorce Low Little Voting
given wife married given edu. control
working ever mar. life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Suffrage late
Est. with actual date –0.06 0.052 0.053 0.023 –0.039 0.061 0.838 –0.107
P(stronger) 0.004 0.001 0.06 0.051 0 0.13 0.036 0.035
Notes: Summary table of the placebo simulations randomizing the introduction year of female suffrage. They
are performed by running 1,500 estimates on the main sample of Swiss women.
Data source: Swiss population census individual data, 1980-2010.
Table 7 summarizes the results of the simulations for a large set of our dependent variables.12
The highest probability of observing equally strong or stronger estimates in these simulations is
about 13 percent for educational outcomes, which is low given that this is a rather conservative
test. The remaining probabilities are far below this lying between 0 and 6 percent.
The fact that overall we do not observe foreign national women to react to female suffrage in the
same manner as Swiss women to female suffrage and that we fail to reproduce similarly strong
effects of female suffrage using simulated introduction dates in the time around the actual ones
leads us to conclude that our main findings are unlikely to be produced by some general cohort-
canton-specific societal changes but rather by the institutional change of granting women formal
political participation rights.
8 Conclusion
Changes in women’s lives have to a large extent marked the social and economic transformation
in countries with developed economies over the last century. For the United States, Goldin
(2006) termed the transformation of women’s employment, education and family as a “quiet
revolution” (p.1) that led to the change in women’s roles in society and households, i.e. “[i]t
12 More detailed descriptions of the simulations can be found in Table A3 in the Appendix.
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was a change from passive actors, who take the income and time allocation of other members
as given, to active participants who bargain somewhat effectively in the household and the
labor market” (p. 2). Most of this development is understood as a consequence of technological
advances in the economy but also in medicine, especially with the contraceptive “pill”.
In this paper, we emphasize the forces unleashed by a sometimes not so quiet revolution, i.e. the
enfranchisement of women. The main argument is that female suffrage not only led to political
empowerment, but increased women’s perceptions of control also in the private sphere, expand-
ing the conceivable opportunity set for them and their daughters in the short- and long-run. We
investigate this channel that contributed to women’s emancipation in a developed country ide-
ally suited to address the empirical challenges that emerge in such an analysis, i.e. by providing
a control for many potential confounding factors that also shape women’s lives. In particular,
we exploit the variation in the age at which women experienced enfranchisement that resulted
from the staggered introduction of female suffrage across the Swiss cantons. Specifically, we
study how socialization in an environment in which women hold formal democratic participa-
tion rights changed women’s lives in terms of their labor force participation, their educational
attainment, as well as their marital status.
Based on more than two million observations, we find that women who were denied the right to
vote for longer have a lower probability of carrying out paid work later on in life compared to
women who experienced enfranchisement before the age of 17. Further, we observe that women
experiencing enfranchisement later have a higher probability of being a housewife, and a higher
probability of working part-time for those in work. Women who obtained the right to vote later
are further more likely to marry and to stay married. Finally, women who were socialized in an
environment without female suffrage are more likely to end up with a low level of education.
Consistent with the idea that formal political participation rights increase self-efficacy, we find
that women who experienced the introduction of female suffrage after they turned 17 are more
likely to report that they have little influence on daily life and that others determine what
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they do. We further observe lower voting participation for women socialized in an environment
without female suffrage.
While previous research strikingly documents the long-term persistence of gender norms, often
due to their institutionalization in unequal property rights, our results propose that changes in
constitutional rights have the potential to trigger a transformation in these norms in the short-
to mid-term. Specifically, we show that power sharing in the form of women’s enfranchisement
has substantially changed women’s labor force participation as well as their educational and
marital choices over only one to two generations.
38
References
Abdelzadeh, A. and E. Lundberg (2017). Solid or Flexible? Social Trust from Early Adolescence
to Young Adulthood. Scandinavian Political Studies 40 (2), 207–227.
Aidt, T. S. and B. Dallal (2008). Female Voting Power: The Contribution of Women’s Suffrage
to the Growth of Social Spending in Western Europe (1869–1960). Public Choice 134 (3-4),
391–417.
Akbulut-Yuksel, M., D. Okoye, and M. Yuksel (2017). Learning to Participate in Politics:
Evidence from Jewish Expulsions in Nazi Germany. IZA Discussion Paper No. 10778, IZA.
Akerlof, G. and R. Kranton (2000). Economics and Identity. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 115 (3), 715–753.
Alesina, A., B. Brioschi, and E. L. Ferrara (2016). Violence Against Women: A Cross-cultural
Analysis for Africa. NBER Working Paper No. 21901, NBER.
Alesina, A., P. Giuliano, and N. Nunn (2013). On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and
the Plough. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (2), 469–530.
Ashraf, N., N. Bau, N. Nunn, and A. Voena (2016). Bride Price and Female Education. NBER
Working Paper No. 22417, NBER.
Bandura, A., C. Barbaranelli, G. V. Caprara, and C. Pastorelli (2001). Self-efficacy Beliefs
as Shapers of Children’s Aspirations and Career Trajectories. Child Development 72 (1),
187–206.
Beaman, L., E. Duflo, R. Pande, and P. Topalova (2012). Female Leadership Raises Aspirations
and Educational Attainment for Girls: A Policy Experiment in India. Science 335 (6068),
582–586.
Bowles, S. (1998). Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other
Economic Institutions. Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1), 75–111.
39
Bussey, K. and A. Bandura (1999). Social Cognitive Theory of Gender Development and Dif-
ferentiation. Psychological Review 106 (4), 676.
Coppock, A. and D. P. Green (2016). Is Voting Habit Forming? New Evidence from Experiments
and Regression Discontinuities. American Journal of Political Science 60 (4), 1044–1062.
Dahl, G., A. Kotsadam, and D.-O. Rooth (2018). Does Integration Change Gender Attitudes?
The Effect of Randomly Assigning Women to Traditionally Male Teams. NBER Working
Paper No. 24351, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Doepke, M., M. Tertilt, and A. Voena (2012). The Economics and Politics of Women’s Rights.
Annual Review of Economics 4 (1), 339–372.
Fernández, R. (2013). Cultural Change as Learning: The Evolution of Female Labor Force
Participation over a Century. American Economic Review 103 (1), 472–500.
Fernandez, R. and A. Fogli (2009). Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work, and
Fertility. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 1 (1), 146–177.
Franklin, M. N., P. Lyons, and M. Marsh (2004). Generational Basis of Turnout Decline in
Established Democracies. Acta Politica 39 (2), 115–151.
Fuchs-Schündeln, N. and M. Schündeln (2015). On the Endogeneity of Political Preferences:
Evidence from Individual Experience with Democracy. Science 347 (6226), 1145–1148.
Fujiwara, T., K. Meng, and T. Vogl (2016). Habit Formation in Voting: Evidence from Rainy
Elections. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8 (4), 160–88.
Gaddis, I. and S. Klasen (2014). Economic Development, Structural Change, and Women’s
Labor Force Participation. Journal of Population Economics 27 (3), 639–681.
Gecas, V. (1989). The Social Psychology of Self-efficacy. Annual Review of Sociology 15 (1),
291–316.
40
Ghani, S. E., A. Mani, and S. D. O’Connell (2013). Can Political Empowerment Help Economic
Empowerment? Women Leaders and Female Labor Force Participation in India. Policy
Research Working Paper No. 6675, World Bank.
Giuliano, P. (2017). Gender: A Historical Perspective. In S. L. Averett, L. M. Argys, and S. D.
Hoffman (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Women and the Economy, pp. 1–32. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Giuliano, P. and A. Spilimbergo (2013). Growing up in a Recession. Review of Economic
Studies 81 (2), 787–817.
Goldin, C. (2006). The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women’s Employment, Education,
and Family. American Economic Review 96 (2), 1–21.
Gottlieb, J. and A. L. Robinson (2016). The Effects of Matrilineality on Gender Differences in
Political Behavior Across Africa. University of California at Berkley, Mimeo.
Hooghe, M. and B. Wilkenfeld (2008). The Stability of Political Attitudes and Behaviors Across
Adolescence and Early Adulthood: A Comparison of Survey Data on Adolescents and Young
Adults in Eight Countries. Journal of Youth and Adolescence 37 (2), 155–167.
Klimstra, T., W. Hale, Q. Raaijmakers, S. Branje, and W. Meeus (2009). Maturation of Per-
sonality in Adolescence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96 (4), 898.
Koukal, A. M. (2017). How Vatican II Influenced Female Enfranchisement: A Story of Rapid
Cultural Change. CREMA Working Paper No. 2017-07, CREMA.
Koukal, A. M. and R. Eichenberger (2017). Explaining a Paradox of Democracy: The Role of
Institutions in Female Enfranchisement. CREMA Working Paper No. 2017-13, CREMA.
Krosnick, J. A. and D. F. Alwin (1989). Aging and Susceptibility to Attitude Change. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 57 (3), 416.
41
Lane, R. E. (1988). Procedural Goods in a Democracy: How One is Treated Versus What One
Gets. Social Justice Research 2 (3), 177–192.
Lott, Jr, J. R. and L. W. Kenny (1999). Did Women’s Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of
Government? Journal of Political Economy 107 (6), 1163–1198.
Lutz, G. and D. Strohmann (1998). Wahl-und Abstimmungsrecht in den Kantonen. Bern,
Stuttgart, Wien: Haupt.
Malmendier, U. and S. Nagel (2011). Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect
Risk Taking? Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (1), 373–416.
Manser, M. and M. Brown (1980). Marriage and Household Decision-making: A Bargaining
Analysis. International Economic Review 21 (1), 31–44.
McAdams, D. P. and B. D. Olson (2010). Personality Development: Continuity and Change
Over the Life Course. Annual Review of Psychology 61, 517–542.
Meredith, M. (2009). Persistence in Political Participation. Quarterly Journal of Political
Science 4 (3), 187–209.
Miller, G. (2008). Women’s Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American
History. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (3), 1287–1327.
Mullainathan, S. and E. Washington (2009). Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance
and Political Attitudes. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1 (1), 86–111.
Plutzer, E. (2002). Becoming a Habitual Voter: Inertia, Resources, and Growth in Young
Adulthood. American Political Science Review 96 (1), 41–56.
Roberts, B. W., K. E. Walton, and W. Viechtbauer (2006). Patterns of Mean-level Change in
Personality Traits Across the Life Course: A Meta-analysis of Longitudinal Studies. Psycho-
logical Bulletin 132 (1), 1–25.
42
Ruckstuhl, L. (1986). Frauen sprengen Fesseln. Bonstetten: Interfeminas Verlag.
Russo, S. and H. Stattin (2017). Stability and Change in Youths’ Political Interest. Social
Indicators Research 132 (2), 643–658.
Studer, B. (2015). Das Frauenstimm- und Wahlrecht in der Schweiz 1848–1971. Österreichische
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften 26 (2), 14–40.
Stutzer, A. and L. Kienast (2005). Demokratische Beteiligung und Staatsausgaben: Die
Auswirkungen des Frauenstimmrechts. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 141 (4),
617–650.
Teso, E. (2016). The Long-Term Effect of Demographic Shocks on the Evolution of Gender
Roles: Evidence from the Transatlantic Slave Trade. Harvard University, Mimeo.
Tur-Prats, A. (2016). Family Types and Intimate-Partner Violence: A Historical Perspective.
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Mimeo.
von Roten, I. (1958). Frauen im Laufgitter. Offene Worte zur Stellung der Frau. Bern: Hallwag.
Witt, S. D. (1997). Parental Influence on Children’s Socialization to Gender Roles. Adoles-
cence 32 (126), 253–259.
43
Appendix
A.I Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1: Introduction dates of female suffrage in Swiss cantons
Canton Year of first exposure Level Comments
(treatment)
Aargau 1971 * municipal/cantonal in February 1971
Appenzell A.Rh. 1971 * municipal in April 1972; cantonal in April 1989
Appenzell I.Rh. 1971 * municipal/cantonal in November 1990
Basel-City 1966 cantonal/municipal
Basel-County 1968 cantonal municipal in September 1970
Berne 1971 * municipal/cantonal in December 1971
Fribourg 1971 * municipal/cantonal in February 1971
Geneva 1960 cantonal/municipal
Glarus 1971 * municipal/cantonal in May 1971
Grison 1971 * cantonal in March 1972; municipal in February 1983
Jura 1971 * municipal/cantonal in December 1971
(as part of Bern)
Luzern 1970 cantonal/municipal
Neuchâtel 1959 cantonal/municipal
Nidwalden 1970 municipal cantonal in April 1972
Obwalden 1968 municipal cantonal in September 1972
St. Gallen 1971 * municipal/cantonal in January 1972
Schaffhausen 1971 * municipal/cantonal in February 1971
Schwyz 1971 * municipal/cantonal in March 1972
Solothurn 1971 * cantonal in June 1971; municipal in March 1980
Thurgau 1971 * municipal/cantonal in December 1971
Ticino 1969 cantonal/municipal
Uri 1971 * municipal/cantonal in March 1972
Vaud 1959 cantonal/municipal
Valais 1970 cantonal/municipal
Zug 1971 * municipal/cantonal in February 1971
Zurich 1970 cantonal/municipal
Notes: This table lists the introduction years of female suffrage for each canton as used in our analysis. Cantons
that introduced the voting right for women at the same time or after the decision to introduce it on the federal
level are marked with a * and the year of its introduction on the federal level is used.
Sources: Ruckstuhl (1986), Lutz and Strohmann (1998), and Koukal (2017).
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Figure A1: This figure visualizes the density of the age at which women experienced the introduction
of female suffrage in our main sample of Swiss women. The red vertical line indicates the cutoff at the
age of 17 years after which we consider a women to be primarily socialized in an environment without
female suffrage.
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Table A2: Female suffrage and women’s life choices: Effect heterogeneity between conservative and
liberal municipalities
Working Working Part-time House- Ever Divorced Low High
given given wife married given edu. edu.
ever mar. working ever mar.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Suffrage at
age0−16 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Conservative –0.031*** –0.031*** 0.007 0.041*** 0.049*** –0.045*** 0.051*** –0.045***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
age17−20 –0.010 –0.004 0.003 0.010 0.013 –0.012** –0.006 –0.007
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Conservative x –0.027*** –0.018** 0.017** 0.029*** –0.002 –0.013** 0.074*** 0.006
age17−20 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004)
age21−25 –0.024** –0.011 0.027** 0.023* 0.031*** –0.013 0.001 –0.012**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005)
Conservative x –0.023*** –0.015** 0.016* 0.022** –0.018** –0.026*** 0.101*** 0.012**
age21−25 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005)
age26−35 –0.047*** –0.028* 0.045*** 0.046** 0.036*** –0.034*** 0.017 –0.010
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.006)
Conservative x –0.013* –0.006 0.016** 0.013 –0.026*** –0.018** 0.135*** 0.018***
age26−35 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.005)
age26−35 –0.089*** –0.066*** 0.049** 0.086*** 0.039*** –0.052*** 0.020 –0.006
(0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.027) (0.011) (0.012) (0.035) (0.008)
Conservative x 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.004 –0.028*** –0.047*** 0.004 0.154*** 0.025***
age36−58 (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.024) (0.006)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age x
canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. 0.55 0.47 0.50 0.32 0.77 0.09 0.38 0.07
No. of obs. 849,967 653,900 464,238 849,967 849,967 653,900 849,967 849,967
No. of clusters 26 25 25 26 26 25 26 26
R2 0.17 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.20 0.06
Notes: Sample of Swiss females living in birth municipality. Municipalities are categorized into liberal and
conservative ones according to men’s voting behavior in the first federal referendum on women’s right to vote in
1959. Controls include indicators for individuals’ religious denomination. Standard errors are clustered at the
cantonal level and reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Data source: Swiss population census individual data, 1980-2010.
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Table A3: Summary of placebo simulations for Swiss women
Dependent variable Mean Std. dev. Median Min. Max. Obs.
Working
Suffrage late
Est. with actual date −0.060 1
Simulated coef. −0.012 0.021 −0.012 −0.067 0.040 1,500
P(stronger) 0.004 0 1 1,500
Part-time given working
Est. with actual date 0.052 1
Simulated coef. 0.010 0.014 0.010 −0.039 0.053 1,500
P(stronger) 0.001 0 1 1,500
Housewife
Est. with actual date 0.053 1
Simulated coef. 0.012 0.026 0.011 −0.054 0.077 1,500
P(stronger) 0.060 0 1 1,500
Ever married
Est. with actual date 0.023 1
Simulated coef. 0.007 0.009 0.007 −0.031 0.040 1,500
P(stronger) 0.051 0 0 1,500
Divorced given ever married
Est. with actual date −0.039 1
Simulated coef. −0.009 0.010 −0.009 −0.034 0.026 1,500
P(stronger) 0 0 1 1,500
Low education
Est. with actual date 0.061 1
Simulated coef. 0.017 0.038 0.016 −0.094 0.136 1,500
P(stronger) 0.131 0 1 1,500
Little control over life events
Est. with actual date 0.838 1
Simulated coef. 0.122 0.391 0.116 −1.221 1.761 1,500
P(stronger) 0.036 0 1 1,500
Voting participation
Est. with actual date −0.107 1
Simulated coef. −0.024 0.050 −0.028 −0.196 0.185 1,500
P(stronger) 0.035 0 1 1,500
Notes: Main sample of Swiss women. The simulations are based on 1,500 runs.
Data source: Swiss population census individual data, 1980-2010.
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